Lecture 4. MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
Plan
1. The character of the Medieval Philosophy
2. The main features of the Middle Age philosophy
3. The philosophers of that period
During the decline of Greco-Roman civilization, Western philosophers turned their attention from the scientific investigation of nature and the search for worldly happiness to the problem of salvation in another and better world. By the 3rd century ad, Christianity had spread to the more educated classes of the
The Geographical and Chronological Boundaries of Medieval Philosophy
‘Medieval philosophy’ refers to philosophy in
The originators of the notion of the Middle Ages were thinking primarily of the so called “Latin West,” the area, roughly speaking, of Roman Catholicism. While it is true that this region was to some extent a unit, culturally separate from its neighbors, it is also true that medieval philosophy was decisively influenced by ideas from the Greek East, from the Jewish philosophical tradition, and from Islam. If one takes medieval philosophy to include the Patristic period, as the present author prefers to do, then the area must be expanded to include, at least during the early centuries, Greek-speaking eastern Europe, as well as North Africa and parts of Asia Minor.
The chronological limits of medieval philosophy are equally imprecise. Henry [1967] takes it to begin with
Scholars have advocated many different termini for our period, and there seems to be little agreement and indeed little basis for reasoned argument on these points. The Middle Ages begin, we are told, with the death of Theodosius in 395, or with the settlement of Germanic tribes in the Roman Empire, or with the sack of Rome in 410, or with the fall of the Western Roman Empire (usually dated C.E. 476), or even as late as the Moslem occupation of the Mediterranean. It ends … with the fall of Constantinople, or with the invention of printing, or with the discovery of
Still, it is perhaps most useful not to think of medieval philosophy as defined by the chronological boundaries of its adjacent philosophical periods, but as beginning when thinkers first started to measure their philosophical speculations against the requirements of Christian doctrine and as ending when this was no longer the predominant practice. This view allows late ancient and early medieval philosophy to overlap during the Patristic period; thus Proclus (411–85) belongs to the story of ancient philosophy, even though he is later than Saint Augustine (354–430). Again, this view accommodates the fact that late scholasticism survived and flourished even in the Renaissance. Thus Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), who can arguably be regarded as the last chapter in the history of medieval philosophy, was contemporary with Francis Bacon (1561–1626). Nevertheless by c. 1450, at the latest, radically new ways of doing philosophy were clearly emerging.
This perhaps generous interpretation of the chronological limits of medieval philosophy implies that it lasted at least from the Greek patristic author Justin Martyr (mid-second century) until well into the fifteenth century — more than half the entire history of philosophy generally. Clearly there is much to be discussed.
The Main Ingredients of Medieval Philosophy
Here is a recipe for producing medieval philosophy: Combine classical pagan philosophy, mainly Greek but also in its Roman versions, with the new Christian religion. Season with a variety of flavorings from the Jewish and Islamic intellectual heritages. Stir and simmer for 1300 years or more, until done.
This recipe produces a potent and volatile brew. For in fact many features of Christianity do not fit well into classical philosophical views. The notion of the Incarnation and the doctrine of the Trinity are obvious cases in point. But even before those doctrines were fully formulated, there were difficulties, so that an educated Christian in the early centuries would be hard pressed to know how to accommodate his religious views into the only philosophical tradition available. To take just one example, consider pagan philosophical theories of the soul. At first glance, it would appear that the Platonic tradition would be most appealing to an early Christian. And in fact it was. In the first place, the Platonic tradition was very concerned with the moral development of the soul. Again, that tradition saw the highest goal of a human being as some kind of mystical gazing on or union with the Form of the Good or the One; it would be easy to interpret this as the “face to face” encounter with God in the next life that St. Paul describes in 1 Cor. 13:12. Most important of all, Platonism held that the soul could exist apart from the body after death. This would obviously be appealing to Christians, who believed in an afterlife.
On the other hand, there was another crucial aspect of Christianity that simply made no sense to a Platonist. This was the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead at the end of the world. Platonism allowed for reincarnation, so there was no special theoretical problem for a Platonist about the soul’s reentering the body. But for a Christian this resurrection was something to look forward to; it was a good thing. This would be incomprehensible from a Platonic viewpoint, for which “the body is the prison of the soul,” and for which the task of the philosopher is to “learn how to die” so that he might be free from the distracting and corrupting influences of the body. No, for a Platonist is it best for the soul not to be in the body.
A Christian would therefore have a hard time being a straightforward Platonist about the soul. But neither could he be an straightforward Aristotelian. Aristotle’s own views on the immortality of the soul are notoriously obscure, and he was often interpreted as denying it outright. All the harder, therefore, to make sense of the view that the resurrection of the dead at the end of the world is something to be joyfully expected.
This problem illustrates the kind of difficulties that emerge from the above “recipe” for medieval philosophy. An educated early Christian, striving to deal with his religion in terms of the only philosophical traditions he knew, would plainly have a lot of work to do. Such tensions may be regarded as the “motors” that drove much of philosophy throughout the period. In response to them, new concepts, new theories, and new distinctions were developed. Of course, once developed, these tools remained and indeed still remain available to be used in contexts that have nothing to do with Christian doctrine. Readers of medieval philosophy who go on to study John Locke, for instance, will find it hard to imagine how his famous discussion of “personal identity” in the Essay concerning Human Understanding could ever have been written if it were not for the medieval distinction between “person” and “nature,” worked out in dealing with the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity.
The Availability of Greek Texts
While the influence of classical pagan philosophy was crucial for the development of medieval philosophy, it is likewise crucial that until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries almost all the original Greek texts were lost to the Latin West, so that they exerted their influence only indirectly. They were “lost” not in the sense that the texts were simply unavailable but in the sense that very few people could read them, since they were written in the wrong language. As the
In the case of Plato, the Middle Ages for all practical purposes had only the first part of the Timaeus (to 53c), hardly a typical Platonic dialogue, in a translation and commentary by a certain Calcidius (or Chalcidius). The Timaeus contains Plato’s cosmology, his account of the origin of the cosmos.
There were also translations of the Meno and the Phaedo made in the twelfth century by a certain Henry Aristippus of
There had been a few other Latin translations made even much earlier, but these vanished from circulation before the Middle Ages got very far along. Cicero himself had translated the Protagoras and a small part of the Timaeus, and in the second century Apuleius translated the Phaedo, but these translations disappeared after the sixth century and had very little effect on anyone. (Klibansky [1982], pp. 21–22.) As
This state of affairs lasted until the Renaissance, when Marsilio Ficino (1433–99) translated and commented on the complete works of Plato. Thus, except for roughly the first half of the Timaeus, the Middle Ages did not know the actual texts of Plato.
As for Plotinus, matters were even worse. His Enneads (the collection of his writings) were almost completely unavailable. Marius Victorinus is said to have translated some of the Enneads into Latin in the fourth century, but his translation, if in fact it really existed, seems to have been lost soon afterwards.
For Aristotle, the Middle Ages were in somewhat better shape. Marius Victorinus translated the Categories and On Interpretation. A little over a century later, the logical works in general, except perhaps for the Posterior Analytics, were translated by Boethius, c. 510–12, but only his translations of the Categories and On Interpretation ever got into general circulation before the twelfth century. The rest of Aristotle was eventually translated into Latin, but only much later, from about the middle of the twelfth century. First there came the rest of the logical works, and then the Physics, the Metaphysics, and so on. Essentially all the works had been translated by the middle of the thirteenth century. (Dod [1982].) This “recovery” of Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was a momentous event in the history of mediaeval philosophy.
Still, while it important to emphasize this absence of primary texts of Greek philosophy in the Latin Middle Ages, it is also important to recognize that the medievals knew a good deal about Greek philosophy anyway. They got their information from (1) some of the Latin patristic authors, like Tertullian, Ambrose, and Boethius, who wrote before the knowledge of Greek effectively disappeared in the West, and who often discuss classical Greek doctrines in some detail; and (2) certain Latin pagan authors such as Cicero and Seneca, who give us (and gave the medievals) a great deal of information about Greek philosophy.
During the first part of the Middle Ages, Platonic and neo-Platonic influences dominated philosophical thinking. “Plato himself does not appear at all, but Platonism is everywhere,” as Gilson has said. (Gilson [1955], p. 144.) This situation prevailed until the recovery of Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Hence, even though it is sometimes still done, it is quite wrong to think of medieval philosophy as mainly just a matter of warmed-over commentaries on Aristotle. For most of the Middle Ages by far, Aristotle was of decidedly secondary importance. This of course is not to deny that when Aristotle did come to dominate, he was very dominant indeed and his influence was immense.
From the Patristic Period to the Mid-Twelfth Century
“Patrology” or “patristics” is the study of the so called “Fathers (patres) of the Church.” In this sense, ‘fathers’ does not mean priests, although of course many patristic authors were priests. Neither does it does mean “fathers” in the sense of “founding fathers,” although many patristic authors were likewise foundational for everything that came afterward. Rather ‘fathers’ in this sense means “teachers.” See, for example,
Augustine
By no means all patristic authors are of philosophical significance, but many of them definitely are. By far the most important is
His authority has been felt much more broadly, and for a much longer time, than Aristotle’s, whose role in the Middle Ages was comparatively minor until rather late. As for Plato, for a long time much of his influence was felt mainly through the writings of Augustine. For more than a millennium after his death, Augustine was an authority who simply had to be accommodated. He shaped medieval thought as no one else did. Moreover, his influence did not end with the Middle Ages. Throughout the Reformation, appeals to Augustine’s authority were commonplace on all sides. His theory of illumination lives on in Malebranche and in Descartes’s “light of nature.” His approach to the problem of evil and to human free will is still widely held today. His force was and is still felt not just in philosophy but also in theology, popular religion, and political thought, for example in the theory of the just war. (Spade [1994], pp. 57–58.)
Yet despite his philosophical preeminence, Augustine was not, and did not think of himself as, a philosopher either by training or by profession. By training he was a rhetorician, by profession first a rhetorician and teacher of rhetoric, then later Bishop of Hippo (modern
Boethius
After Augustine, the first thinker of philosophical note was Boethius (c. 480–524/525) (see Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius). Boethius is no doubt best known today for The Consolation of Philosophy, a dialogue in five books between Boethius and “Lady Philosophy,” an allegorical figure who appears to him in a vision while he is languishing in jail under sentence of death for treason. Boethius had occupied a high station in society and government. He was born into a family with an excellent old Roman pedigree, and rose to a position of immense power and influence in the Ostrogothic kingdom under Theodoric. Although for a while he was conspicuously successful, he nevertheless eventually fell into disfavor, was charged with treasonable conspiracy having to do with the Emperor Justin in Constantinople (Boethius claims he was innocent), was arrested and finally executed.[14] In the Consolation, Boethius and Lady Philosophy discuss the problem of evil and the fickleness of fortune—a particularly pressing issue for Boethius, given the circumstances under which the work was written.
But although the Consolation is justly famous, both in our own day and in the Middle Ages, Boethius’s long-term importance probably rests more on his translations and commentary activity. For Boethius was well educated, and was one of the increasingly rare people in the West who knew Greek well, not just the language but the intellectual culture. He came up with the lofty goal to translate Plato and Aristotle into Latin, write commentaries on the whole of that material, and then write another work to show that Plato and Aristotle essentially said the same thing:
If the more powerful favor of divinity grants it to me, this is [my] firm purpose: Although those people were very great talents whose labor and study translated into the Latin tongue much of what we are now treating, nevertheless they did not bring it into any kind of order or shape or in its arrangement to the level of the [scholarly] disciplines. [Hence I propose] that I turn all of Aristotle’s work—[or] whatever [of it] comes into my hands—into the Latin style and write commentaries in the Latin language on all of it, so that if anything of the subtlety of the logical art was written down by Aristotle, of the weightiness of moral knowledge, of the cleverness of the truth of physical matters, I will translate it and even illuminate it with a kind of “light” of commentary. [Then,] translating all of Plato’s dialogues or even commenting [on them], I will bring them into Latin form. Once all this is done, I will not fail to bring the views of Aristotle and Plato together into a kind of harmony and show that they do not, as most people [think], disagree about everything but rather agree on most things, especially in philosophy. (Boethius [1880], pp. 79. 9–80.6 [my translation].)
No doubt this plan would have proved unmanageable even if Boethius had not been executed in his mid-forties. In particular, while the Consolation certainly shows a knowledge of the Timaeus, Boethius does not appear to have actually translated any Plato at all, despite his intentions. He did, however, translate Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation, together with Porphyry of Tyre’s Isagoge, a kind of “introduction” to Aristotle’s Categories. He also appears to have translated the other works in Aristotle’s Organon (except perhaps for the Posterior Analytics, about which there is some doubt), but the fate of those translations is obscure; they did not circulate widely until much later. (Dod [1982], pp. 53–54.)
In addition to his translations, Boethius wrote a number of logical treatises of his own. These are, first of all, a commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, which is no longer extant. Whether or not he translated the Posterior Analytics, there may have been a commentary on it, but if so it has not survived and did not have any influence. (Ebbesen [1973].) The same goes for a possible (incomplete) commentary on the Prior Analytics. (Obertello [1974], I, pp. 230–32.) More important were a series of commentaries (one on the Categories, two each on the On Interpretation and on Porphyry’s Isagoge, and one on Cicero’s Topics) (see Medieval Theories of Categories), together with several other works on categorical and hypothetical syllogisms, logical “division,” and on the differences between Aristotle’s and Cicero’s Topics. (Chadwick [1981], Gibson [1981], Obertello [1974].) Together all these logical writings, both the translations and the others, constitute what later came to be called the “Old Logic” (= logica vetus). Some of the works were more influential than others. But basically, everything the Middle Ages knew about logic up to the middle of the twelfth century was contained in these books. As a result, Boethius is one of the main sources for the transmission of ancient Greek philosophy to the Latin West during the first half of the Middle Ages.
Boethius is also important for having introduced the famous “problem of universals” in the form in which it was mainly discussed throughout the Middle Ages (see the medieval problem of universals).
He also proved to be influential in the twelfth century and afterwards for the metaphysical views contained in a series of short studies known collectively as the Theological Tractates.
The Carolingian Period
After Boethius, as the classical Greco-Roman world grew ever more distant, philosophy—and to some extent culture generally—entered a period of relative stagnation, a period that lasted until after the year 1000. There was one short-lived bright spot, however, the late-eighth and early-ninth century court of Charlemagne (768–814) and his successors, the so called “Carolingian” period. The major philosophical figure in this period was John Scottus Eriugena (c. 800–c. 877), an Irish monk who was at the court of Charles the Bald around 850 (see John Scottus Eriugena). Curiously, the knowledge of Greek was still not quite dead in
Among his translations, the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius are surely the most important and influential (see Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite). The true identity of the man we call “Pseudo-Dionysius” is unknown, but he lived probably in the late-fifth century, somewhere in the Greek-speaking near East, and was very much influenced by the late neo-Platonist Proclus. Whoever he was, he claimed to be a certain Dionysius who is reported to have been among the philosophers on the Areopagus in Athens when St. Paul went there to preach (Acts 17:19–34). Most of the audience on that occasion laughed at Paul and his novel doctrines.
But some of them joined him and became believers, including Dionysius the Areopagite and a womaamed Damaris, and others with them. (Acts 17:34.)
Damaris and the “others” have disappeared without a trace, but our unknown later author pretends to be the Dionysius mentioned in this passage.
The Pseudo-Dionysian writings consist of four treatises and a series of ten letters. The most philosophically important of them are the two treatises On the Divine Names and On Mystical Theology. Through them the Latin West was introduced to what is sometimes called “darkness mysticism,” the tradition that interprets mystical experience not in terms of an “intellectual vision” (compare Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, where the Form of the Good is described as the dazzling sun), but in terms of the will rather than the intellect, darkness rather than light. (Compare later mystical expressions such as “dark night of the soul,” “cloud of unknowing.”)
It is also mainly through these two treatises that medieval philosophy got the still familiar view that there are three ways of talking about God, by trying to say what he is like (the via affirmativa), by saying instead what he is not (the via negativa), and by a kind of “combined” way that speaks of God with affirmative predicates, but with some kind of mark of superexcellence (the via eminentiae, “God is more than good, more than wise.”).
Among Eriugena’s own writings, the two most important ones were surely On the Division of Nature (= De divisione naturae or, under a Greek title, Periphyseon) and On Predestination (= De praedestinatione), both very strongly influenced by the neo-Platonic texts Eriugena was translating. Both works were condemned, On Predestination soon after it was written. On the Division of Nature is a large, systematic work in four books, presenting a vision of reality in strongly neo-Platonic terms. The unfamiliarity of this kind of thinking in Western Christendom, which was strongly influenced by Augustine, no doubt contributed to his later reputation of being a heretic.
Anselm of Canterbury
After its brief “renaissance” during the Carolingian period, education and culture declined once again for roughly another 200 years. Then, shortly after the turn of the millennium, things began to revive. The Germanic “barbarian” tribes that had so disturbed the late Roman empire had long since settled down, and the later Viking raiders had by this time become respectable “
Simultaneously, philosophy becomes increasingly technical and “academic.” Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) represents a major transitional figure (see Saint Anselm). His writings are not yet laden with the technicalities and jargon that make so much later medieval philosophy formidable and inaccessible to the non-specialist. And yet his writings are philosophically “argumentative” in a way much earlier medieval philosophy is not and that looks much more familiar to present-day readers.
Anselm is no doubt best known as the originator of the famous “ontological argument” for the existence of God. But he wrote much else besides, on many philosophical and theological topics. His writings abound in subtle and sophisticated reasoning; indeed, they illustrate the increasing role of “dialectic” in philosophy and theology. In Anselm’s hands, theology begins to develop into an argumentative discipline, less exclusively a matter of “scripture studies” and spirituality and increasingly a matter of systematic exploration and presentation of doctrine. This development grows even more pronounced after Anselm.
Peter Abelard
By the early twelfth century, the revival of education that had begun shortly after the millennium was in full swing. During the first half of the century, the most important philosopher by far was undoubtedly Peter Abelard (1079–1142) (see Peter Abelard). He was also one of the most colorful figures in the entire history of philosophy. His affair with Héloise and his consequent castration are the stuff of legend, and his controversy with the much more traditional Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) has only enhanced his reputation among those who have viewed him (with considerable oversimplification) as a champion of reason over authority. His autobiographical Story of My Adversities (Historia calamitatum) is a “good read” even today, and is one of the most intensely personal documents of the Middle Ages.
Abelard represents the full flower of “early medieval philosophy,” just before the new translations of Aristotle and others transform everything. It is important to realize that, except for the works of Pseudo-Dionysius, which do not appear to have had an important role in Abelard’s thinking, he had access to no more of the original sources of philosophy in the ancient world than anyone else in Europe had had since the time of Boethius. Yet his philosophy is strikingly original. His views on logic and what we would call philosophy of language are sophisticated and novel; indeed, he is a serious contender for the title of the greatest logician of the entire medieval period, early or late. He is one of the first nominalists, and certainly the first important one. His writings on ethics put a new and very strong emphasis on the role of the agent’s intention rather than exterior actions. He also wrote on theological topics such as Trinity.
Abelard’s writings further amplify the tendency, already seen in Anselm, to increase the use of reasoning and argumentation in theology. But whereas Anselm had managed to deflect criticisms of this new approach in theology, Abelard’s disputatious personality alarmed those who were more comfortable with the older style. He was subject to ecclesiastical censure during his lifetime, a fact that no doubt contributes to the relatively few explicit citations of him in the later Middle Ages. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that his influence was widespread.
General Characteristics of This Early Period
Throughout this early medieval period, we find many writers, usually of a broadly “Platonic” persuasion, who deal with philosophical topics in an unsystematic but far from shallow way that does not clearly distinguish philosophy from theology, or for that matter from “wisdom literature” generally. Frequently their views are presented by arguments that amount to an appeal to a “vision” of how things are (“Look, don’t you see?”). This is simply a general although not universal observation about these authors, and should not be regarded as a philosophical limitation or defect. After all, some of the world’s most important philosophy has been presented in such a “visionary” way. Consider the role of “intuition” in twentieth-century phenomenology, for example, not to mention Parmenides’s poem (where the philosophy is presented by a goddess) and much of Plato’s philosophy, including the Allegory of the Cave.
There are many exceptions to this generalization. Boethius’s logical commentaries, for example, are purely philosophical and frequently genuinely argumentative, even if they are often obscure and inaccessible to modern readers. Eriugena’s On the Division of Nature, while definitely “visionary,” is nevertheless quite systematic in its structure. And by the time of Anselm, the role of logical argumentation is beginning to grow. Certainly for Abelard the above generalization fails entirely.
Nevertheless, a big change is about to occur. Prior to Abelard, philosophy in the Middle Ages had not been an exclusively academic affair. It had been addressed for the most part to any well educated reader interested in the topics being discussed. Boethius’s Consolation, for instance, or almost any of Augustine’s or Anselm’s writings, could profitably be read by any literate person. Soon, however, this all changes. Philosophy becomes an increasingly specialized discipline, pursued by and for those whose livelihood is found only in educational institutions. Philosophy and theology become more clearly distinguished from one another; both become more systematic, rigorous and precise. These virtues are accompanied by an increasingly technical jargon, which makes so much late-medieval philosophy intimidating and formidable to non-specialist readers. By the same token, this increasing technicality diminishes the overall sense of moral urgency one finds for example in Augustine’s Confessions or Boethius’s Consolation.
As with the previous generalization, this one should not be regarded as a philosophical fault of the later authors; it is simply a different way of doing philosophy. As David Hume knew, there are two styles of philosophy, each with its own advantages (An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, § 1). What we see in passing from the earlier to the later Middle Ages is a transition from one to the other.
The Twelfth Century and the Rise of Universities
As part of the cultural revival described above, and from the late-eleventh century on, there was a new and increasing interest in having translations of previously unavailable texts, not all of them philosophical by any means. No doubt this new interest was prompted in part by
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o John of Spain (Johannes Hispanus) who translated, among other things, the immensely important Muslim philosopher Avicenna’s (Ibn Sina, 980–1037) Logic from Arabic into Latin.
o Dominic Gundissalinus (or Gundisalvi, an old form of “Gonzales,” fl. late-twelfth century). Gundissalinus translated Avicenna’s Metaphysics, part of his Physics, and some of his other works, as well as writings by the Islamic philosophers Al-Farabi (c. 870–950) and Al-Ghazali (1058–1111). Together with John of Spain, Gundissalinus translated Solomon Ibn Gabirol’s (c. 1022–c. 1058/c.1070) Fountain of Life (Fons vitae). Ibn Gabirol (in Latin, Avicebron, Avencebrol, etc.) was an Iberian Jewish author whose Fountain of Life was written in Arabic. It presents a systematic neo-Platonic view of the cosmos. In addition to these translations, Gundissalinus was also the author of some original philosophical works of his own.
o Gerard of
The Spanish translators worked from Arabic texts. In the case of Aristotle, they used Arabic translations of Aristotle’s Greek, sometimes with an earlier Syriac link in between. After such a circuitous route, it is no less than amazing that the Latin Europeans were able to understand anything at all of these newly available Aristotelian works. Eventually the extensive and thorough commentaries by the Moorish Ibn Rushd (in Latin, Averroes, 1126–98) were translated from Arabic as well. These commentaries were extremely important in shaping the late medieval understanding of Aristotle, although some of the views contained in them became highly controversial.
By the end of the twelfth century, almost all of Aristotle’s works available today had been translated into Latin and, together with the commentaries and other newly translated texts, gradually began to circulate. By the mid-thirteenth century, they were widely known. The first things to spread were the remaining logical writings of Aristotle’s Organon, those not already widely known from Boethius’s translations some six hundred years previously. These new logical writings, as distinct from the “Old Logic” (Logica vetus) stemming from Boethius, became known collectively as the “New Logic” (Logica nova). After them, the Physics, Metaphysics and other Aristotelian writings gradually became known.
This relatively sudden injection of so much new and unfamiliar material into
As part of the revival that began after the turn of the millennium, new forms of education began to emerge in
· Monastic schools. These were schools that had been regularly associated with monasteries ever since the sixth century. Much of Anselm’s most important work, for instance, including the Proslogion containing his “ontological argument,” was penned at the monastic
o Hugh of St. Victor (c. 1096–1141), the author of a Didascalicon on the various liberal arts. Hugh was also a theologian and theorist of mysticism.
o Richard of St. Victor (c. 1123–73), who succeeded Hugh as master of the school. Richard, like Hugh, was a theorist of mysticism. He also wrote an important treatise on the doctrine of the Trinity, the first serious alternative to Augustine’s approach in the latter’s own On the Trinity. Unlike Hugh, Richard was much more favorably disposed toward the new use of dialectic or logic in theology. He is said to have written a treatise of his own on logic but it does not appear to have survived.
· Individual “masters.” Beginning in the mid-eleventh century, individual scholars would occasionally set up a “school” of their own and gather students around them. Such schools were sometimes itinerant, and depended entirely on the appeal of the teaching “master.” Perhaps the closest analogue to this arrangement would be the modern “martial arts” schools one often finds in present-day cities. The practice declined after c. 1150. Abelard conducted such a “school” at Melun in the very early eleventh century, and seems earlier to have attended a similar “school” conducted by a certain Roscelin (c. 1045–c. 1120), a controversial nominalist whose writings have mostly not survived, but who had in effect been accused by Anselm of out-and-out tritheism on the doctrine of the Trinity.
· Cathedral schools. These were schools associated with the official church of a bishop, and played a role similar to that of the monastic schools for monasteries: they trained young clerics and occasionally others as well. Before William of Champeaux left
· Universities. Parliament and the “university” are arguably the two great medieval institutions that have survived more or less intact to the present day. (The Church may be counted as a conspicuous third, depending on one’s views about the Reformation and Counter-Reformation.) Frequently, universities grew out of cathedral schools. Thus, the cathedral school at
The
Universities were divided into “faculties.” The four most common ones were the faculties of arts, law, medicine, and theology. Most universities had arts faculties, in addition to one or more of the others. The arts faculty was for the basic training of students, before they proceeded to one of the “higher” faculties. In effect, the arts faculty was the equivalent of the modern undergraduate program. As for the “higher” faculties,
In the medieval university, philosophy was cultivated first and foremost in the arts faculty. When the newly translated works of Aristotle first appeared at the
Why were these prohibitions issued? In part it was out of a genuine concern for the purity of the faith. Aristotelianism was thought, and rightly so, to be theologically suspect. Besides, European academics were just getting acquainted with most of Aristotle, and at this early stage of their acquaintance they weren’t altogether sure just what he meant and what the implications were. A “go slow” approach was not an altogether unreasonable course of action to adopt. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that some of the basis for the prohibitions was simply a resistance to new ideas.
The Thirteenth Century and Later
By their very nature, universities brought together masters and students from all over
Histories of medieval philosophy often treat Thomas Aquinas (1224/25–74), John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308), and William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) as the “big three” figures in the later medieval period; a few add Bonaventure (1221–74) as a fourth. Although there is certainly ample justification for giving special emphasis to these authors, it would misleading if one thought one could get even a fair overall picture from them alone. Nevertheless, the list is instructive and illustrates several things.
First of all, not one of these three or four authors was French. Aquinas and Bonaventure were Italian, Scotus—as his name implies—was a Scot, and Ockham was English. All but Ockham spent at least part of their careers at the
The fact that Buridan has not been generally acknowledged in the same rank as the four “greats,” even though he is certainly a formidable contender, points to an important feature of the twentieth-century historiography of later medieval philosophy. Buridan was what is known as a “secular master.” That is, although he was a priest, he did not belong to any of the religious “orders.”[25] Beginning in the early-thirteenth century, several new orders were founded, notably the Franciscans (1209) and the Dominicans (1216), both of which became very prominent in late medieval universities. Aquinas was a Dominican, while Bonaventure, Scotus, and Ockham were Franciscans.
Religious orders tend to keep good records, including the writings of their members, so that historians of medieval philosophy typically have more material to work with for authors in the various orders than they do for “secular” figures like Buridan. Besides, other things being equal, orders understandably prefer to “champion their own” in academic as in other matters, and when the academic champion comes relatively early in the history of his order, he can come to be regarded as representing the order’s authentic “position,” thereby influencing the views of later members of the order.[26] In this way, Aquinas soon became the semi-“official” philosopher and theologian of the Dominicans, a status that was enhanced in
The upshot of all this is that major late medieval philosophers, like Buridan, who did not belong to a religious order have often suffered from neglect in standard histories of medieval philosophy, at least until fairly recently. Another neglected secular master was Henry of Ghent, a very important late-thirteenth century figure who has turned out to be crucial for understanding much of Duns Scotus, but whose views have only in the last few decades begun to be seriously studied (see Henry of Ghent).
For that matter, even many important and influential late medieval philosophers who did belong to religious orders are still virtually unknown or at least woefully understudied today, despite the labors of generations of scholars. Their works have never been printed and exist only in handwritten manuscripts, written in a devilishly obscure system of abbreviation it takes special training to decode. It is probably safe to say that for no other period in the history of European philosophy does so much basic groundwork remain to be done.
Some Main Topics in Medieval Philosophy
Medieval philosophy included all the main areas we think of as part of philosophy today. Nevertheless, certain topics stand out as worthy of special mention. To begin with, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that medieval philosophy invented the philosophy of religion. To be sure, ancient pagan philosophers sometimes talked about the nature of the gods. But a whole host of traditional problems in the philosophy of religion first took on in the Middle Ages the forms in which we still often discuss them today:
· The problem of the compatibility of the divine attributes.
· The problem of evil. Ancient philosophy had speculated on evil, but the particularly pressing form the problem takes on in Christianity, where an omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent God freely created absolutely everything besides himself, first emerged in the Middle Ages.
· The problem of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge with human free will. Many medieval authors appealed to human free will in their response to the problem of evil, so that it was especially important to find some way to reconcile our free will with divine foreknowledge (see (see Medieval Theories of Future Contingents).
As for logic, the great historian of logic I. M. Bocheński ([1961], pp. 10–18) remarked that the later Middle Ages was—along with the ancient period from roughly 350–200 BCE and the recent period from Boole and Peano on—one of the three great, original periods in the history of logic. Although we have learned much about the history of logic since Bocheński wrote, and although we can find individual notable figures in logic who fall outside any of his three great periods, his observation is still by and large correct. From the time of Abelard through at least the middle of the fourteenth century, if not later, the peculiarly medieval contributions to logic were developed and cultivated to a very high degree. It was no longer a matter of interpreting Aristotle, or commenting on the works of the “Old Logic” or the “New Logic”; wholly new genres of logical writing sprang up, and entirely new logical and semantic notions were developed. For logical developments in the Middle Ages, see the articles insolubles, literary forms of medieval philosophy, Medieval Theories of Categories, medieval semiotics, medieval theories of analogy, Medieval Theories of Demonstration, medieval theories of modality, medieval theories of Obligations, medieval theories: properties of terms, medieval theories of singular terms, medieval theories of the syllogism, and sophismata. For information on some contributors to medieval logic, see the articles Albert of Saxony, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius), John Buridan, John Wyclif, Johannes Sharpe, Paul of Venice, Peter Abelard, Peter of Spain, Richard Kilvington, Richard the Sophister, Roger Bacon, Thomas of Erfurt, Walter Burley, William Heytesbury, and William of Ockham.
In metaphysics, the Middle Ages has a well deserved reputation for philosophical excellence. The problem of universals, for example, was one of the topics that were discussed at this time with a level of precision and rigor it would be hard to find matched before or since. But it was by no means the only such question. For some of the main topics in metaphysics on which medieval philosophers sharpened their wits, see the articles binarium famosissimum, existence, Medieval Mereology, the medieval problem of universals, medieval theories of causality, medieval theories of haecceity, and medieval theories of relations. For some important contributors to medieval metaphysics, see the articles John Buridan, John Duns Scotus, John Wyclif, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and William of Ockham.
Iatural philosophy and philosophy of science, medieval philosophy was of course very strongly—but not exclusively—influenced by Aristotle. See, for example, the articles medieval theories of causality and Saint Thomas Aquinas. Particularly from the fourteenth century on, the increasing use of mathematical reasoning iatural philosophy would eventually pave the way for the rise of early modern science later on. Important figures in this development include William Heytesbury and William of Ockham. Other important contributors to medieval natural philosophy include Albert of Saxony, Dietrich of Freiberg, John Buridan, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Nicole Oresme, Robert Grosseteste, and William Crathorn.
Medieval epistemology was not, with some noteworthy exceptions, particularly worried over the problem of skepticism, over whether we have genuine knowledge (see Medieval Skepticism). The tendency was to take it for granted that we do, and instead to ask about how this comes about: what are the mechanisms of cognition, concept formation, etc. Medieval epistemology, therefore, typically shades into what we would nowadays call philosophical psychology or philosophy of mind; after the recovery of Aristotle’s On the Soul, it was regarded as a branch of the philosophy of nature. For some of the important topics discussed in the area of medieval epistemology, see the articles divine illumination, medieval theories of demonstration, and mental representation in medieval philosophy. For some important medieval authors in this area, see the articles John Buridan, John Duns Scotus, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas, Walter Chatton, and William of Ockham.
For details on some important developments in medieval ethics, see the articles medieval theories of conscience, medieval theories of practical reason, and the natural law tradition in ethics. For some of the major contributors to medieval ethics, see the articles John Duns Scotus, Peter Abelard, Peter of Spain Saint Anselm, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham, elsewhere in this Encyclopedia. For some important figures in medieval political theory, see the articles Dante Alighieri, John Wyclif, John Wyclif’s Political Philosophy and William of Ockham.
The above lists of topics and important figures should be regarded as only representative; they are far from exhaustive.
Augustine, Saint
I INTRODUCTION
Augustine, Saint (354-430), greatest of the Latin Fathers and one of the most eminent Western Doctors of the Church.
Augustine was born on November 13,
II INTELLECTUAL STRUGGLE
Inspired by the philosophical treatise Hortensius, by the Roman orator and statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero, Augustine became an earnest seeker after truth. He considered becoming a Christian, but experimented with several philosophical systems before finally entering the church. For nine years, from 373 until 382, he adhered to Manichaeism, a Persian dualistic philosophy then widely current in the
About 383 Augustine left
III BISHOP AND THEOLOGIAN
He returned to
Augustine’s doctrine stood between the extremes of Pelagianism and Manichaeism. Against Pelagian doctrine, he held that human spiritual disobedience had resulted in a state of sin that humaature was powerless to change. In his theology, men and women are saved by the gift of divine grace; against Manichaeism he vigorously defended the place of free will in cooperation with grace. Augustine died at Hippo, August 28, 430. His feast day is August 28.
IV WORKS
The place of prominence held by Augustine among the Fathers and Doctors of the Church is comparable to that of
The process of reconciling the Greek emphasis on reason with the emphasis on religious emotion in the teachings of Christ and the apostles found eloquent expression in the writings of
The Platonic philosophy was combined with the Christian concept of a personal God who created the world and predestined (determined in advance) its course, and with the doctrine of the fall of humanity, requiring the divine incarnation in Christ. Augustine attempted to provide rational understanding of the relation between divine predestination and human freedom, the existence of evil in a world created by a perfect and all-powerful God, and the nature of the Trinity. Late in his life Augustine came to a pessimistic view about original sin, grace, and predestination: the ultimate fates of humans, he decided, are predetermined by God in the sense that some people are granted divine grace to enter heaven and others are not, and human actions and choices cannot explain the fates of individuals. This view was influential throughout the Middle Ages and became even more important during the Reformation of the 16th century when it inspired the doctrine of predestination put forth by Protestant theologian John Calvin.
Augustine conceived of history as a dramatic struggle between the good in humanity, as expressed in loyalty to the “city of
The only major contribution to Western philosophy in the three centuries following the death of Augustine in ad 430 was made by the 6th-century Roman statesman Boethius, who revived interest in Greek and Roman philosophy, particularly Aristotle’s logic and metaphysics. In the 9th century the Irish monk John Erigena developed a pantheistic interpretation of Christianity, identifying the divine Trinity with the One, Logos, and World Soul of Neoplatonism and maintaining that both faith and reason are necessary to achieve the ecstatic union with God.
Even more significant for the development of Western philosophy was the early 11th-century Muslim philosopher Avicenna. His work modifying Aristotelian metaphysics introduced a distinction important to later philosophy between essence (the fundamental qualities that make a thing what it is—the treeness of a tree, for example) and existence (being, or living reality). He also demonstrated how it is possible to combine the biblical view of God with Aristotle’s philosophical system. Avicenna’s writings on logic, mathematics, physics, and medicine remained influential for centuries.
Scholasticism
I.INTRODUCTION
Scholasticism, philosophic and theological movement that attempted to use natural human reason, in particular, the philosophy and science of Aristotle, to understand the supernatural content of Christian revelation. It was dominant in the medieval Christian schools and universities of
II PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS
Scholastic thinkers held a wide variety of doctrines in both philosophy and theology. What gives unity to the whole Scholastic movement are the common aims, attitudes, and methods generally accepted by all its members. The chief concern of the Scholastics was not to discover new facts but to integrate the knowledge already acquired separately by Greek reasoning and Christian revelation. This concern is one of the most characteristic differences between Scholasticism and modern thought since the Renaissance.
The basic aim of the Scholastics determined certain common attitudes, the most important of which was their conviction of the fundamental harmony between reason and revelation. The Scholastics maintained that because the same God was the source of both types of knowledge and truth was one of his chief attributes, he could not contradict himself in these two ways of speaking. Any apparent opposition between revelation and reason could be traced either to an incorrect use of reason or to an inaccurate interpretation of the words of revelation. Because the Scholastics believed that revelation was the direct teaching of God, it possessed for them a higher degree of truth and certitude than did natural reason. In apparent conflicts between religious faith and philosophic reasoning, faith was thus always the supreme arbiter; the theologian’s decision overruled that of the philosopher. After the early 13th century, Scholastic thought emphasized more the independence of philosophy within its own domain. Nonetheless, throughout the Scholastic period, philosophy was called the servant of theology, not only because the truth of philosophy was subordinated to that of theology, but also because the theologian used philosophy to understand and explain revelation.
This attitude of Scholasticism stands in sharp contrast to the so-called double-truth theory of the Spanish-Arab philosopher and physician Averroës. His theory assumed that truth was accessible to both philosophy and Islamic theology but that only philosophy could attain it perfectly. The so-called truths of theology served, hence, as imperfect imaginative expressions for the common people of the authentic truth accessible only to philosophy. Averroës maintained that philosophic truth could even contradict, at least verbally, the teachings of Islamic theology.
As a result of their belief in the harmony between faith and reason, the Scholastics attempted to determine the precise scope and competence of each of these faculties. Many early Scholastics, such as the Italian ecclesiastic and philosopher St. Anselm, did not clearly distinguish the two and were overconfident that reason could prove certain doctrines of revelation. Later, at the height of the mature period of Scholasticism, the Italian theologian and philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas worked out a balance between reason and revelation. Scholastics after Aquinas, however, beginning with the Scottish theologian and philosopher John Duns Scotus, restricted more and more the domain of truths capable of being proved by reason and insisted that many doctrines previously thought to have been proved by philosophy had to be accepted on the basis of faith alone. One reason for this restriction was that Scholastics applied the requirements for scientific demonstration, as first specified in Aristotle’s Organon, much more rigorously than previous philosophers had done. These requirements were so strict that Aristotle himself was rarely able to apply them fully beyond the realm of mathematics. It was this trend that led finally to the loss of confidence iatural human reason and philosophy that is characteristic of the early Renaissance and of the first Protestant religious reformers, such as Martin Luther.
Another common attitude among Scholastics was their great respect for the so-called authorities in both philosophy and theology. These authorities were the great philosophers of
The Scholastics considered Aristotle the chief authority in philosophy, calling him simply the Philosopher. The early Christian prelate and theologian
III COMMON METHODS
One of the principal methods of Scholasticism was the use of the logic and philosophic vocabulary of Aristotle in teaching, demonstration, and discussion. Another important method was the practice of teaching a text by means of a commentary by some accepted authority. In philosophy, this authority was usually Aristotle. In theology, the principal texts were the Bible and the Sententiarum Libri Quatuor (Four Books of Sentences) by the 12th-century Italian theologian and prelate Peter Lombard, a collection of the opinions of the early Fathers of the Church on problems of theology. The early Scholastics began by adhering closely to the text on which they were commenting. Gradually, as the practice of critical reading developed their own powers of thinking, they began to introduce many supplementary commentaries on points, known as disputed questions, which either were not covered or were not adequately solved by the text itself. Beginning in the 13th century these supplementary commentaries, embodying the personal thought of the teachers, became the largest and most important part of the commentaries, with the result that literal explanation of the text was reduced to a mere fraction of each commentary.
Closely allied with the commentaries on disputed questions was the technique of discussion by means of public disputation. Every professor in a medieval university was required to appear several times a year before the assembled faculty and students in a disputation, defending crucial points of his own teaching against all persons who challenged them. The forms of Aristotelian logic were employed in both defense and attack. In the 13th century the public disputation became a flexible educational tool for stimulating, testing, and communicating the progress of thought in philosophy and theology. After the middle of the 14th century, however, the vitality of public disputation declined, and it became a rigid formalism. Disputants became concerned less with real content and more with fine points of logic and minute subtleties of thought. This degraded form of disputation did much to give Scholasticism a bad reputation during the Renaissance and later; consequently, many modern thinkers have considered it mere pedantic logical formalism.
IV PRINCIPAL SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHERS
The outstanding Scholastics of the 11th and 12th centuries included Anselm, the French philosopher, theologian, and teacher of logic Peter Abelard, and the philosopher and clergyman Roscelin, who founded the school of philosophy known as nominalism. Among Jewish thinkers of the same period, the rabbi, philosopher, and physician Maimonides attempted to reconcile Aristotelian philosophy with divine revelation, as understood in Judaism, in a spirit similar to that of the Christian Scholastics. The Scholastics of the so-called golden age of the 13th century included Aquinas and the German philosopher St. Albertus Magnus, both of the Dominican order; the English monk and philosopher Roger Bacon, the Italian prelate and theologian St. Bonaventure, and Duns Scotus, all of the Franciscan order; and the Belgian secular priest Henry of Ghent (1217?-1293). Nominalism became the dominant school of philosophy in the 14th century, when Scholasticism began to decline. The most important nominalist was the English philosopher William of Ockham, a great logician who attacked all the philosophic systems of the preceding Scholastics and maintained that natural reason and philosophy had a much more restricted field of operation than his predecessors had held to be the case.
A brilliant but brief revival of Scholasticism, especially in the field of theology, took place in
In the 11th century a revival of philosophical thought began as a result of the increasing contact between different parts of the Western world and the general reawakening of cultural interests that culminated in the Renaissance. The works of Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek thinkers were translated by Arab scholars and brought to the attention of philosophers in
Scholastic thought was less interested in discovering new facts and principles than in demonstrating the truth of existing beliefs. Its method was therefore dialectical (based upon logical argument), and its intense concern with the logic of argument led to important developments in logic as well as theology. The Scholastic philosopher Saint Anselm of
The Italian Scholastic philosopher Saint Bonaventure combined Platonic and Aristotelian principles and introduced the concept of substantial form, or nonmaterial substance, to account for the immortality of the soul. Bonaventure’s view tended toward pantheistic mysticism in making the aim of philosophy the ecstatic union with God.
The 13th-century German Scholastic philosopher Saint Albertus Magnus was the first Christian philosopher to endorse and interpret the entire system of Aristotelian thought. He studied and admired the writings of the Muslim and Jewish Aristotelians and wrote commentaries on Aristotle in which he attempted to reconcile Aristotle’s thought with Christian teachings. He also took a great interest in the natural science of his day. The 13th-century English monk Roger Bacon, one of the first Scholastics to take an interest in experimental science, realized that a great deal remained to be learned about nature. He criticized the deductive method of his contemporaries and their reliance on past authority, and called for a new method of inquiry based on controlled observation (see Deduction).
The most important medieval philosopher was Saint Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican monk who was born in
Aquinas made many important investigations into the philosophy of religion, including an extremely influential study of the attributes of God, such as omnipotence, omniscience, eternity, and benevolence. He also provided a new account of the relationship between faith and reason, arguing against the Averroists that the truths of faith and the truths of reason cannot conflict but rather apply to different realms. The truths of natural science and philosophy are discovered by reasoning from facts of experience, whereas the tenets of revealed religion, the doctrine of the Trinity, the creation of the world, and other articles of Christian dogma are beyond rational comprehension, although not inconsistent with reason, and must be accepted on faith. The metaphysics, theory of knowledge, ethics, and politics of Aquinas were derived mainly from Aristotle, but he added the Augustinian virtues of faith, hope, and charity and the goal of eternal salvation through grace to Aristotle’s naturalistic ethics with its goal of worldly happiness.
Aquinas,
I INTRODUCTION
Aquinas,
Aquinas was born of a noble family in Roccasecca, near Aquino, and was educated at the Benedictine monastery of Monte Cassino and at the
II EARLY YEARS
Aquinas was ordained a priest about 1250, and he began to teach at the
In 1256 Aquinas was awarded a doctorate in theology and appointed professor of philosophy at the
III STUDY OF ARISTOTLE AND THE AVERROISTS
To understand the crucial importance of this controversy for Western thought, it is necessary to consider the context in which it occurred. Before the time of Aquinas, Western thought had been dominated by the philosophy of
Averroism threatened the integrity and supremacy of Roman Catholic doctrine and filled orthodox thinkers with alarm. To ignore Aristotle, as interpreted by the Averroists, was impossible; to condemn his teachings was ineffectual. He had to be reckoned with. Albertus Magnus and other scholars had attempted to deal with Averroism, but with little success. Aquinas succeeded brilliantly.
Reconciling the Augustinian emphasis upon the human spiritual principle with the Averroist claim of autonomy for knowledge derived from the senses, Aquinas insisted that the truths of faith and those of sense experience, as presented by Aristotle, are fully compatible and complementary. Some truths, such as that of the mystery of the incarnation, can be known only through revelation, and others, such as that of the composition of material things, only through experience; still others, such as that of the existence of God, are known through both equally. All knowledge, Aquinas held, originates in sensation, but sense data can be made intelligible only by the action of the intellect, which elevates thought toward the apprehension of such immaterial realities as the human soul, the angels, and God. To reach understanding of the highest truths, those with which religion is concerned, the aid of revelation is needed. Aquinas’s moderate realism placed the universals firmly in the mind, in opposition to extreme realism, which posited their independence of human thought. He admitted a foundation for universals in existing things, however, in opposition to nominalism and conceptualism.
IV LATER YEARS
Aquinas first suggested his mature position in the treatise De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas (1270), which has been translated into English as The Trinity and the Unicity of the Intellect (1946). This work turned the tide against his opponents, who were condemned by the church.
Aquinas left
Aquinas was canonized by Pope John XXII in 1323 and proclaimed a Doctor of the Church by Pope Pius V in 1567.
V ASSESSMENT
More successfully than any other theologian or philosopher, Aquinas organized the knowledge of his time in the service of his faith. In his effort to reconcile faith with intellect, he created a philosophical synthesis of the works and teachings of Aristotle and other classic sages; of Augustine and other church fathers; of Averroës, Avicenna, and other Islamic scholars; of Jewish thinkers such as Maimonides and Solomon ben Yehuda ibn Gabirol; and of his predecessors in the Scholastic tradition. This synthesis he brought into line with the Bible and Roman Catholic doctrine.
Aquinas’s accomplishment was immense; his work marks one of the few great culminations in the history of philosophy. After Aquinas, Western philosophers could choose only between humbly following him and striking off in some altogether different direction. In the centuries immediately following his death, the dominant tendency, even among Roman Catholic thinkers, was to adopt the second alternative. Interest in Thomist philosophy began to revive, however, toward the end of the 19th century. In the encyclical Aeterni Patris (Of the Eternal Father, 1879), Pope Leo XIII recommended that
Medieval Philosophy After Aquinas
The most important critics of Thomistic philosophy (adherence to the theories of Aquinas) were the 13th-century Scottish theologian John Duns Scotus and 14th-century English Scholastic William of Ockham. Duns Scotus developed a subtle and highly technical system of logic and metaphysics, but because of the fanaticism of his followers the name Duns later ironically became a symbol of stupidity in the English word dunce. Scotus rejected the attempt of Aquinas to reconcile rational philosophy with revealed religion. He maintained, in a modified version of the double-truth doctrine of Averroës, that all religious beliefs are matters of faith, except for the belief in the existence of God, which he regarded as logically provable. Against the view of Aquinas that God acts in accordance with his rational nature, Scotus argued that the divine will is prior to the divine intellect and creates, rather than follows, the laws of nature and morality, thus implying a stronger notion of free will than that of Aquinas. On the issue of universals, Scotus developed a new compromise between realism and nominalism, accounting for the difference between individual objects and the forms that these objects exemplify as a logical rather than a real distinction.
William of Ockham formulated the most radically nominalistic criticism of the Scholastic belief in intangible, invisible things such as forms, essences, and universals. He maintained that such abstract entities are merely references of words to other words rather than to actual things. His famous rule, known as Ockham’s razor—which said that one should not assume the existence of more things than are logically necessary—became a fundamental principle of modern science and philosophy.
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