THE ROLE OF UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTANCE OF EACH OTHER IN
COMMUNICATION. COMMUNICATION IN MEDICAL PRACTICE. EMPATHY. FUNDAMENTALS OF
NURSING PSYCHOTHERAPY
Accessible vs. inaccessible attitudes
According
to Fazio, attitudes often influence behaviour through a spontaneous process. Effects of attitudes can occur quickly,
but only for people whose attitude is accessible (easy to retrieve). When
attitudes are accessible, they come to mind instantly when we see the attitude
object. The attitude then influences how we behave
towards the object. If the attitude is less accessible, it doesn’t come to mind,
and so it doesn’t influence our behaviour.
For example, suppose you
are walking by an ice cream seller. You may spontaneously recall your
passion for ice cream, and this attitude may motivate a decision to
buy some. But if you don’t spontaneously recall your attitude (because it
is inaccessible – perhaps you are distracted by a more pressing
thought at the time you walk past the ice cream seller), it will
lie dormant and not elicit the decision to buy. Indeed, there’s a great
deal of evidence that attitudes do exert a stronger influence
on behaviour when they are accessible than when they are difficult
to retrieve.
FORMING AND CHANGING ATTITUDES
Incentive for change
To understand how
attitudes can be changed, it is first important to understand attitude
functions – the psychological needs that attitudes fulfil. Early theories
proposed a number of important attitude functions. For example, people may have
a positive attitude towards objects that help them become popular
among people they like, but not objects that make them estranged from those people.
This is the social adjustment function, which provides the basis for
the entire fashion industry: people tend to like clothing that is
popular among people they like.
In the earliest model of
attitude change, Hovland, Janis and Kelley suggested that persuasive
messages change people’s attitudes when they highlight some incentive
for this change. For example, an advertisement might describe the
utilitarian benefits of buying a particular model of car (e.g. good
fuel economy) or the social-adjustment benefits (e.g. a
sporty look). The incentives must seem important if the message recipients
are to change their attitude.
Hovland et al.’s theory
also suggests that processing of any message must occur in stages if it
is to be successful. The intended audience must:
1. pay
attention to the message,
2. comprehend
the message, and
3. accept
the message’s conclusions.
Seminal theories of attitude function
McGuire’s
information-processing approach to persuasion McGuire extended this theory
further. According to his model, a message will elicit the desired
behaviour only if it succeeds at six stages. People must:
1. encounter
the message (presentation stage);
2. attend
to it (attention stage);
3. understand
it (comprehension stage);
4. change
their attitude (yielding stage);
5. remember
their new attitude at a later time (retention stage);and
6. the
new attitude must influence their behaviour (behavior stage).
Interestingly, even if
the odds of passing each stage are quite good, the chances of completing all
the stages can be low. For example, we might optimistically assume that a
Nike running shoe ad has an 80 per cent chance of success at each stage. If this were the
case, the laws of probability indicate that the odds of
successfully completing
all of the stages would be only 0.26 (0.8 ×0.8 × 0.8 × 0.8
× 0.8 × 0.8). In other words, the ad would have a 26 per cent
chance of getting someone to buy the running shoes.
In reality, the odds of
completion of each stage (especially yielding and behaviour) may be far
lower, creating even lower chances of success (possibly less than 1 per
cent). For this reason, modern marketing initiatives take steps to
compel completion of each stage, where this is possible. So
advertisers will present the message many times, make it attention-grabbing
and memorable, and make the message content as powerful as
they can.
Motivation and ability
Two
newer models of persuasion, the ‘elaboration likelihood
model’ and the
‘heuristic–systematic model’predict that the effects of
persuasive messages depend on people’s motivation and ability to think
carefully about them. If someone is highly motivated and able to process a persuasive
message, they should be heavily influenced by the strength of
the arguments in the message. But if they are less motivated or able
to process the message, then they should be strongly affected by
simple cues within the message, such as the presenter’s
attractiveness or expertise. Many variables influence motivation and ability.
Motivation is high when the message is relevant to personal goals and there
is a fear of being wrong. Ability is high when people are not
distracted and when they possess high cognitive skills. Although
all of these variables have been studied in connection with both
models of persuasion, most of this research has focused on the
personal relevance of the message.
For example, Petty et
al. found that the
attractiveness of the spokesperson presenting a message
influences attitudes when the issue is not personally relevant, but
has no effect when the issue is personally relevant. In contrast, the strength of the argument within the message influences attitudes when the
issue is personally relevant, but not
when the issue is not personally relevant. These findings support
the predictions of the elaboration likelihood model and the
heuristic–systematic model.
Although many experiments have revealed similar effects, the heuristic–systematic model suggests that high personal relevance should not always lead to the lower use of cues such as the presenter’s attributes. For example, when a personally relevant message contains ambiguous arguments (i.e. it has strengths and weaknesses), people may be more persuaded by a message from an expert source than from an inexpert source.
According to this model,
high personal relevance causes people to use environmental cues when the message
arguments themselves provide no clear conclusions. This
prediction has received
some experimental support.
Early theories of attribution
We said earlier that
attributions are explanations for events and behaviour. Heider differentiated
between two types of causal attribution – personal and situational.
Personal attributions refer to factors within the person, such as their
personality characteristics, motivation, ability and effort. Situational
attributions refer to factors within the environment that are external to the person. For
example, if we were discussing why a particular student has failed an important
university examination, we would consider personal factors (such as her
academic ability and how much effort she invested in preparing for
the exam). But we might also look at situational attributions (such as whether she had
good tuition, access to library facilities and sufficient time to study).
Heider noted that we
tend to overestimate internal or personal factors and underestimate
situational factors when explaining behaviour. This tendency has become
known as the fundamental attribution error, which we’ll return to in the
next section.
In a similar vein, Jones
and Davis found that we tend to make a correspondent inference about
another person when we are looking for the cause of their behaviour.
In other words, we tend to infer that the behaviour, and the
intention that produced it, correspond to some underlying stable
quality. For example, a correspondent inference would be to attribute someone’s aggressive
behaviour to an internal and stable trait within the person – in this case,
aggressiveness. Jones and Davis argued that this tendency is motivated by our
need to view people’s behaviour as intentional and predictable,
reflecting their underlying personality traits. But in reality,
making correspondent inferences is not always a straightforward business.
The information we need in order to make the inferences can be
ambiguous, requiring us to draw on additional cues in the environment, such as
the social desirability of the behaviour, how much choice the person had, or
role requirements.
Like Heider, Kelley
likened ordinary onlookers to naive scientists who weigh up several
factors when attributing causality. Kelley’s covariation model of
attribution states that, before two events can be accepted as causally
linked, they must co-occur.
The covariation of
events and behaviour was assessed across three important dimensions:
1. consistency
– does the person respond in the same way to the same stimuli over time?
2. distinctiveness
– do they behave in the same way to other different stimuli, or is the behaviour
distinctively linked to specific stimuli?
3. consensus
– do observers of the same stimuli respond in a similar way?
Kelley argued that we
systematically analyse people- and environment-related information, and that
different combinations of information lead to different causal attributions. For
example, while attributing causality for behaviour like ‘John laughed at
the comedian’, we would run through the following considerations:
1. If John always laughs
at this comedian, then his behavior is highly consistent.
2. If John is easily
amused by comedians, then his behavior has low distinctiveness.
3. If practically no one
else in the audience laughed at the comedian, then his behaviour has low
consensus.
A combination of high
consistency, low distinctiveness and low consensus would lead to a
dispositional (internal) attribution for John’s laughter, such as ‘John has a
peculiar tendency to laugh at all comedians; he must be very easily
amused.’ In contrast, a combination of high consistency, high
distinctiveness and high consensus would lead to an external
attribution, such as ‘John likes this comedian, but he doesn’t like many
other comedians, and other people like this comedian too; this
comedian must be funny.
The effects of bias
Both the Jones–Davis and
the Kelley models of attribution view the social perceiver as a rational
person who uses logical principles of thinking when attributing
causality. But empirical research has discovered persistent biases in
the attributional processes. According to Fiske and Taylor, bias occurs if
the social perceiver systematically distorts
(over-uses or under-uses) what are thought to be correct and logical
procedures. We will now look in more detail at four of the most
pervasive biases: the fundamental attribution error, the actor–observer effect,
the self-serving bias and the ultimate attribution error.
The fundamental
attribution error Ross defined the fundamental attribution
error (FAE) as the tendency to underestimate the role of
situational or external factors, and to overestimate the role of dispositional
or internal factors, in assessing behaviour.
The earliest
demonstration of the FAE was an experiment by Jones and Harris, in which American
college students were presented with another student’s written essay
that was either for or against the Castro government in Cuba. Half
the participants were told that the essay writer had freely
chosen whether to write a ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ Castro essay (choice
condition), and the other half were told that the essay writer was told which
position to take (no-choice condition). After reading the essay,
participants were asked what the essay writer’s ‘true’ attitude
was towards Castro’s Cuba. The participants tended to view the
writer’s attitude as consistent with the views expressed in the
essay, regardless of the choice/no-choice condition. While they didn’t totally
disregard that the no-choice writers had been told what position to take, they viewed this as less important
than their attitudinal disposition. In other words, they
underestimated the impact of the no-choice condition. In another classic
study, Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz randomly assigned pairs of
participants in a quiz game to act as contestant and
questioner. Questioners were instructed to set ten difficult
general knowledge questions of their own choosing. Despite the relative
situational advantage of the questioners, both the contestants and
observers of the quiz game rated the questioners as
significantly more knowledgeable than the contestants. Heider put
forward a largely cognitive explanation for the FAE. He suggested that behaviour has
such salient properties that it tends to dominate our perceptions. In other words, what we notice
most in (a) behaviour and (b) communication is (c) the person who is central to both.
People are dynamic actors – they move, talk and interact, and these
features come to dominate our perceptual field. Supporting this cognitive explanation, Fiske and Taylor
argued that situational factors such as social context, roles and situational
pressures are ‘relatively pallid and dull’ in comparison with the charisma of the dynamic actor. While
this is a commonsense and intuitive explanation, we discuss later in this chapter how
this bias is only pervasive in Western individualistic cultures. So the FAE
turns out to be not so fundamental after all!
The actor–observer effect
While we tend to attribute
other people’s behaviour to dispositional factors, we tend to attribute our own
behaviour to situational factors. This is called the actor–observer effect (AOE).
Consider how easily we
explain our own socially undesirable behaviour (such as angry outbursts)
to extenuating, stressful circumstances, and yet we are less sympathetic when
others behave in this way. Instead, we often conclude that the
person is intolerant, impatient, unreasonable, selfish, etc.
This bias has been found in both laboratory experiment and applied clinical settings. For example,
psychologists and psychiatrists are more likely to attribute their
clients’ problems to internal stable dispositions, whereas the clients
are more likely to attribute their own problems to situational factors.
There are several competing explanations for the AOE, but we will outline just
two of them here.
1 Perceptual salience As
for the FAE, one explanation is perceptual and essentially argues that actors
and observers quite literally have ‘different points of view’. As actors, we can’t
see ourselves acting. From an actor’s point of view, what is most salient and available are the situational influences on behaviour – the objects, the people, the
role requirements and the social setting. But from an observer’s point of view, other
people’s behaviour is more dynamic and salient than the situation or context.
These different vantage points for actors an observers appear to lead to
different attributional tendencies, i.e. situational attributions for actors
and dispositional attributions for observers.
Taylor and Fiske attempted
to test the perceptual salience hypothesis by placing observers at three
different vantage points around two male confederates who sat
facing each other engaged in conversation. Observers sat either
behind confederate
A with confederate B in
their direct visual field, or behind B, watching A, or to the side, between
A and B with both in sight.
A schematic figure
of a study that attempted to test the perceptual salience hypothesis. Two
confederates sat facing each other and were engaged in conversation. They
were observed from three different vantage points – from behind Confederate A, from
behind Confederate B, and from midway between A and B. Consistent with the perceptual salience hypothesis, the results
showed that observers sitting behind A, watching B, rated B as more causal, while those
sitting behind B, watching A, saw A as more causal. The observers watching
from midway between A and B perceived both as equally influential.
After A and B had
interacted for five minutes, each observer was asked to rate each
confederate on various trait dimensions, and the extent to which their
behaviour was caused by dispositional and situational factors. They
also rated how much each confederate (a) set the tone of the
conversation, (b) determined the kind of information exchanged and (c) caused the other’s
behaviour.
Consistent with the
perceptual salience hypothesis, Taylor and Fiske found that the two observers
sitting behind A, watching B, rated B as more causal, while those sitting
behind B, watching A, saw A as more causal. The observers sitting in
between A and B perceived both confederates as equally
influential.
In a similar vein,
McArthur and Post manipulated the salience of two people engaged in
conversation through the use of lighting. When one participant was made more
salient than the other by being illuminated by bright light, observers rated
the behaviour of the illuminated person as more dispositionally and less
situationally caused.
2 Situational information Another explanation for the AOE focuses on information. Actors have more information about the situational and contextual influences on their behaviour, including its variability and flexibility across time and place. But observers are unlikely to have such detailed information about the actors unless they know them very well, and have observed their behavior over time and in many different situations. It therefore seems that observers assume more consistency in other people’s behavior compared to their own, and so make dispositional attributions for others, while making situational attributions for their ownbehaviour.
The self-serving bias
It is well known that
people tend to accept credit for success and deny responsibility for failure.
More generally, we also tend to attribute our success to internal
factors such as ability, but attribute failure to external factors such as bad
luck or task difficulty. This is known as the self-serving bias. How often
have we heard governments taking credit when there is national economic growth
and prosperity, attributing it to their economic policies and prudent
financial management?
And yet, in times of
economic hardship, they are quick to blame external causes, such as the international
money markets or worldwide recession. Although the strength of the self-serving
bias varies across cultures, it has been found to occur cross-culturally.
The usual explanation is
motivational factors: that is, the need for individuals to enhance their
self-esteem when they succeed and protect their self-esteem when they fail.
Attributing success to internal causes has been referred to as the
self-enhancing bias, and attributing failure to external causes as
the self-protection bias. But Miller and Ross argue that there is
only clear support for the self-enhancing bias, and that people do often accept
personal responsibility for failure. They also claim that the self-enhancing bias can be
explained by cognitive factors without recourse to motivational explanations.
For example, we are more likely to make self-attributions for expected than unexpected
outcomes, and most of us expect to succeed rather than fail. Even so, it is
difficult to argue against the motivational hypothesis, and the
prevailing consensus is that both motivational and cognitive factors have a part in
the self-serving bias.
The motivation for
self-enhancement is also linked to achievement attributions. According to
Weiner’s attributional theory of motivation and emotion, the
attributions people make for success and failure elicit different
emotional consequences, and are characterized by three underlying
dimensions – locus, stability and control (see table).
Achievement attributions
for success and failure, and their characteristics on the three underlying
dimensions of locus, stability and control
The locus dimension
refers to whether we attribute successand failure internally or externally.
Consistent with the self enhancement bias, we are more likely to feel
happier and better about ourselves if we attribute our success internally (to factors
such as ability and effort) rather than externally (to good luck or an easy task). In
contrast, attributing failure internally is less likely to make us feel good
about ourselves than attributing it externally.
The stability dimension
refers to whether the cause is perceived as something fixed and stable
(like personality or ability) or something changing and unstable (such as motivation
or effort).
The controllability
dimension refers to whether we feel we have any control over the cause.
The tendency to
attribute negative outcomes and failure to internal, stable and uncontrollable
causes is strongly associated with clinical depression and has been referred
to as a depressive attributional style. The reformulated learned
helplessness model of depression views this attributional style as directly
causing depression. But others have argued that it is merely a symptom,
reflecting the affective state of the depressed individual.
Whether it is a cause or symptom, attributional retraining programmes , in which people are
taught to make more self-enhancing attributions, are widely accepted as
an important therapeutic process for recovery from depression.
The ultimate attribution error
The self-serving bias
also operates at the group level. So we tend to make attributions that protect
the group to which we belong. This is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in
what Pettigrew called the ultimate attribution error (UAE).
By extending the
fundamental attribution error to the group context, Pettigrew demonstrated how
the nature of intergroup relations shapes the attributions that group members
make for the same behaviour by those who are in-group and out-group members. So
prejudicial attitudes and stereotypes of disliked out-groups lead to derogating attributions,
whereas the need for positive enhancement and protection
of the in-group leads to group-serving attributions.
People are therefore
more likely to make internal attributions for their group’s positive and socially desirable behaviour, and external
attributions for the same positive behaviour displayed by out-groups.
In contrast, negative or socially undesirable in-group behaviour is usually explained externally,
whereas negative outgroup behaviour is more frequently explained internally.
This intergroup bias has
been found in a number of contexts. Taylor and Jaggi found it among Hindus in southern
India, who gave different attributions for exactly the same behaviour performed by Hindu
and Muslim actors. Duncan found that white American college students
categorized the same pushing behaviour as ‘violent’ if
perpetrated by a black actor but as ‘just playing around’ when perpetrated
by a white actor.
The most dramatic
illustration of the UAE is an investigation by Hunter, Stringer and Watson of how
real instances of violence are explained by Protestants and Catholics in
Northern Ireland. Catholic students made predominantly external attributions for
their own group’s violence but internal, dispositional attributions for Protestant
violence. Similarly, Protestant students attributed their own group’s
violence to external causes and Catholic violence to internal causes.
There is also substantial evidence of the tendency to make more favourable attributions for male success and failure. Studies have found that both men and women are more likely to attribute male success to ability and female success to effort and luck, especially in tasks that are perceived to be ‘male’.
The same bias is found
for failure attributions – male failure is explained by lack of effort, whereas female
failure is attributed to lack of ability. Bear in mind though that most
of these studies were conducted in the seventies and eighties, and relatively few have
been published more recently. Given the social and attitudinal changes associated
with women’s roles over this time, and the fact that the effects
were relatively small, it is possible that these biases have now
diminished in Western societies.
Cultural differences
There is now strong evidence that people in non-Western cultures do not make the same kinds of attributions as people in Western individualistic societies. The fundamental attribution error, which was originally thought to be a universal cognitive bias, is not found in collectivist cultures. Instead, many non-Western people place less emphasis on internal dispositional explanations, and more emphasis on external and situational explanations.
Miller was among the
first social psychologists to suggest that such differences arise from
different cultural representations of the person that are learned
during social development, rather than from cognitive and perceptual
factors. Western notions of the person are predominantly individualistic,
emphasizing the central importance and autonomy of the person,
whereas non Western notions tend to be holistic, stressing the interdependence between the
person and their social relationships, role obligations
and situational norms.
Miller conducted a
cross-cultural study to compare the attributions made for prosocial and deviant
behaviours by a sample of Americans and Indian Hindus of three different age groups
(eight, eleven and fifteen years) and an adult group with a mean age of
40. Miller found that the older Americans made significantly more
dispositional attributions than the older Hindus, and Hindus made significantly
more situational attributions. There were few significant
differences between the American and Hindu children aged eight and eleven. But
Miller found a significant linear age increase in dispositional
attributions among Americans, and a similar linear age increase in
situational attributions for the Indian sample. It therefore appears
that the FAE is very culture specific, and the cognitive
and perceptual explanations originally advanced for the FAE need to be
reconsidered in light of Miller’s findings.
Moscovici and Hewstone
proposed that attributions are not only cognitive, but also social and
cultural phenomena that are based on social representations –
consensually shared knowledge, beliefs and meaning systems that are learned and
socially communicated through language. Every society has its own stock of common sense
and culturally agreed explanations for a wide range of phenomena, such as
health and illness, success and failure, wealth and poverty,
prosocial and deviant behaviour. People do not necessarily engage in
an exhaustive cognitive analysis to explain events around them, as some of the early
models of attribution suggest. Instead, they draw on socially shared and readily
culturally available explanations.
Social schemas
It would be very
difficult to function if we went about our everyday lives without prior
knowledge or expectations about the people, roles, norms and events in our community. Social cognition
research suggests that our behaviour and interactions in the social
world are facilitated by cognitive representations in our minds
called schemas – mental or cognitive structures that contain general
expectations and knowledge of the world.
A schema contains both abstract knowledge and specific examples about a particular social object. It ‘provides hypotheses about incoming stimuli, which includes plans for interpreting and gathering schema-related information’.
Schemas therefore give
us some sense of prediction and control of the social world. They guide what
we attend to, what we perceive, what we remember and what we infer. All schemas
appear to serve similar functions – they all influence the encoding (taking
in and interpretation) of new information, memory
for old information and
inferences about missing information.
Not only are schemas functional,
but they are also essential to our well-being.
A dominant theme in
social cognition research is that we are
cognitive misers, economizing as much as we can on the effort we need to
expend when processing information. Many judge
ments, evaluations and
inferences we make in the hustle and bustle of everyday life are said to be
‘top of the head’phenomena, made with little thought and considered deliberation.
So schemas are a kind of mental
short-hand used to simplify reality and facilitate processing. Schema
research has been applied to four main areas: person
schemas, self schemas, role
schemas and event schemas
Person schemas
Person schemas – often
referred to as person prototypes – are configurations of personality
traits that we use to categorize people and to make inferences about their
behaviour. (The prototype is the ‘central tendency’, or average, of the
category members.) In most Western cultures we tend to categorize individuals
in terms of their dominant personality traits. We may infer from our
observations and interactions with A that he is shy, or that B is opinionated.
Most people would agree that Robin Williams is a prototypical extrovert and
Woody Allen is a prototypical neurotic.
Trait or person schemas
enable us to answer the question: ‘what kind of person is he or she?. In so
doing, they help us to anticipate the nature of our social interactions with
individuals, giving us a sense of control and predictability.
Self schemas
Just as we represent and
store information about others, we do the same about ourselves, developing
complex and varied schemas that define our self-concept based on
past experiences. Self schemas are cognitive representations
about ourselves that organize and process all related
information.
They develop from
self-descriptions and traits that are salient and important to our self-concept.
Indeed, they can be described as components of self-concept that are
central to our identity and self-definition. For example, people who
value independence highly are said to be self-schematic along this
dimension. People for whom dependence–independence is not centrally
important are said to be aschematic on this dimension. Different self schemas become
activated depending on the changing situations and contexts in which we
find ourselves. For example, yourself schema as fun-loving and frivolous
when you are with your friends may be quite different from your self schema as serious and
dutiful when you are with your family. You will have schemas for your
real self and also for your ‘ideal’ and ‘ought’ selves.
Role schemas
The norms and expected
behaviours of specific roles in society are structured into role schemas.
They will include both achieved roles – including occupational and
professional roles, such as doctor or teacher – and ascribed roles, over which
we have little control – such as age, gender and race.
The roles and
expectations associated with these categories are commonly referred to as stereotypes
– mental representations of social groups and their members that are widely shared.
Prolific empirical research on stereotypes views the process of categorizing
individuals into their respective social groups as highly functional
in that it simplifies the inherent complexity of social information.
Social categories such
as male/female, black/white, old/young are viewed as highly salient and
prior to any other kind of person categorization. Fiske refers to age,
gender and race as the ‘top three’ because they are the most central
and visually accessible categories. So when we meet someone for the first
time, we attend to obvious and salient physical cues in guiding our interactions
with them. With increased familiarity, the notion is that stereotypes
based on physical cues become less important, and we may subsequently employ
trait-based or person schemas.
Event schemas
Commonly referred to as
cognitive scripts, event schemas describe behavioural and event
sequences in everyday activities. They provide the basis for anticipating
the future, setting goals and making plans. We know, for example, that the appropriate
behavioural sequence for eating at a restaurant is to enter, wait to
be seated, order a drink, look at the menu, order the meal, eat, pay the bill
and leave. The key idea here is that our commonsense understanding of what constitutes
appropriate behaviour in specific situations is stored in
long-term memory, and it is activated unconsciously whenever we need it.